Introduction
The declared intent of antidumping policy is to protect home industries from unfair competitive practices by foreign firms. In practice, according to the World Trade Organization (WTO) antidumping Agreement, price-based dumping occurs when the foreign firm sells at lower price in the home country market than in the foreign market, while costbased dumping occurs when the foreign firm sells at a price lower than its average cost in the home country market. When there is an evidence of both dumping and material injury to the home industry, the home country may implement antidumping duties, which eliminate the dumping margin.
1 Antidumping policies have become extremely controversial. In recessionary periods, home firms may frequently sell at prices less than average cost without fear of sanctions, while their foreign counterparts may face antidumping duties. Further, many, though not all, forms of price discrimination are fully legal for home firms within the home market. While it is, thus, hard to argue that price discrimination or selling below average cost is unfair per se, proponents of antidumping policy frequently argue that recourse to punitive tariffs is necessary to prevent blatantly unfair predatory practices by foreign firms.
This paper investigates whether antidumping duties are likely to be a reasonable antidote when there is a threat of predation by foreign firms.
Concerns over possible predation by foreign firms have a long history. For example, according to Viner (1931, p. 51-64) , in the early twentieth century the evidence seems to suggest that Germany systematically undertook dumping in a variety of industries, because large-scale cartels in Germany shared dumping costs while high tariffs in Germany prevented foreign competitors from lowering the high home prices. Many countries, thus, adopted antidumping measures against large German cartels, which were accused of eliminating competition in their home markets. In the 1980s, Japan began to dominate the semiconductor industry by charging low prices in international markets (Baldwin 1994) . The U.S. government alleged, somewhat problematically, that dumping by Japanese firms was forcing American semiconductor producers out of business and, thus, an antidumping action was initiated against Japanese semiconductor industry.
1 The WTO antidumping Agreement sets forth procedural requirements for the implementation of antidumping measures, including the calculation of the extent of dumping and the determination of injury. Further, once antidumping duties are in place, the authorities may conduct periodic reviews of the antidumping measures on their own initiatives or upon request home firms. Antidumping duties normally terminate no later than five years after first being applied, unless a review investigation prior to that date establishes that expiry of the duty would be likely to lead to continuation or resumption of dumping and injury.
Questions concerning the efficacy of antidumping policy are becoming increasingly important at present as the use of such measures proliferate. Before the WTO antidumping Agreement came into effect in 1995, antidumping measures were implemented primarily by a small number of developed countries including the U.S., Australia, the E.U., and Canada (see Prusa, 2001 , 595, Table 1 To address the issue of whether antidumping duties provide a solid defense against predation by foreign firms, we adapt the Stackelberg entry deterrence model, pioneered by Dixit (1979) and Brander and Spencer (1981) to provide a simple one-period analysis of predation. The foreign firm is assumed to be a monopoly in the foreign market, but it plays a quantity-setting game with its home-firm rival in the home-country market. Further, we consider the interesting, though likely infrequently occurring, situation where the foreign firm is a first mover by virtue of having to ship goods before the home firm. The foreign firm may use this position to force the home firm out of the market or to accommodate participation of the home firm. Such ``predatory behaviour'' by the foreign firm is clearly harmful to the home firm and may be perceived as unfair. Higher marginal costs for the foreign firm increase the relative attractiveness of accommodation. Thus, in situations where the foreign firm would engage in predation, a sufficiently high anti-predation tariff could be levied to induce accommodation and allow the participation of the home firm.
This paper shows that under some circumstances, an antidumping duties would be implemented in the absence of predation, and under other circumstances, no dumping duty would be imposed in the presence of predation. Even if both predation and dumping by foreign firms coexist, a standard antidumping duty, of the type used in practice, may not be sufficient to preclude predation. The reason is that the height of the anti-predation tariff relies only on the home market conditions, while the height of an antidumping duty depends on both the home and foreign market conditions. Interestingly, when predation and dumping coexist, a sophisticated antidumping duty, which anticipates firm behaviour and eliminates dumping in a single iteration, can prevent predation in those cases where the foreign firm produces a limit quantity just large enough to keep the home firm out of the market. The onerous computational requirements of such sophisticated antidumping duties coupled with the need for dumping and limit-quantity predation to initially coexist, however, vitiate the practical importance of this result. These overall results of this modeling exercise, therefore, suggest that antidumping duties cannot be justified as a policy mechanism to prevent predatory behavior by foreign firms.
In addition, to being harmful to the home firm, predation is typically thought to be harmful to national welfare in the foreign country since there are fewer firms in the market.
Consequently, we also extend welfare analysis in Brander and Spencer (1981) to address two new questions. First, we examine whether home-country welfare unambiguously declines if the foreign firm chooses predation rather than accommodating the participation of the home firm. We conclude that predation by foreign firms may not be welfare reducing. To preempt participation of the home firm, the foreign firm must sell a larger quantity of its product than it would do to accommodate participation. The extra quantity lowers the price of the foreign product, and could raise the overall consumer surplus. If this gain in consumer surplus outweighs the lost profit of the home firm, the home country gains from predation. Second, we investigate whether the home country unambiguously gains from imposing its anti-predation tariff. Even with the addition of home country tariff revenue, there remains an inherent ambiguity concerning the impact on home-country welfare.
There is a strand of previous literature that has explored predatory actions in an international context. Eaton and Mirman (1991) show that when the home firm has imperfect information on the state of demand in the foreign market where the foreign firm is a monopolist, the foreign firm may engage in signal-jamming by means of ``predatory dumping'' or overshipping to the home market in the first period of a two period game so as to garner a greater market share in the home market in the second period. Hartigan (1994) explores a pricesetting game where the home firm cannot observe whether the foreign firm has high or low marginal costs. Given that the home firm will exit after the first period due to negative profits if it is faced with a low cost foreign firm, the foreign firm may have an incentive to engage in signal-jamming by mimicking a low-cost, low-price firm in the first period so as to reap monopoly profits in the second period. In Harigan (1996) , predatory dumping may also arise when capital markets in the home country are imperfect and will not lend to a home firm to keep it solvent after the first period. In the Hartigan (1994 and 1996) articles, antidumping policy may increase the costs of predatory dumping and, thereby, diminish the probability of its occurrence.
We build on this literature in two important directions. First we show that the foreign firm may preempt the participation of the home firm and engage in predation even in the presence of full information and perfect capital markets. In our model, the simple presence of economies of scale in production arising from quasi-fixed costs act as an impediment to participation by the home firm and provide an opportunity for predation by the foreign firm.
Second, we also demonstrate that antidumping policy, as currently configured, provides a weak defense against such predation at best.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model quantity leadership, which generates possible predatory equilibria as well as conventional Stackelberg equilibria. In section 3, we investigate how the choice of tariffs affects the leadership behaviour of the foreign firm and the resulting equilibrium. Thereafter, in section 4 we determine the tariff that is just sufficient to prevent predation and then, in section 5, we compare the anti-predation tariff with standard and sophisticated antidumping duties. Section 6 analyses the impact of predation and predation-preventing tariffs on national welfare and then section 7 provides concluding remarks. Appendices provide technical details on the quantity-leadership game and outlines a price leadership game, which gives broadly similar results.
A Simple Model of International Predation
Suppose that two firms are potential participants in an oligopoly game by merit of having previously incurred sunk costs. On the basis of ex ante expectations, the first firm, which is located in the foreign country, has invested hf f ψ on research and development and product adaptation enabling it to participate in the home market as well as the foreign market.
Meanwhile the second firm, which is located in the home country, has invested h h ψ on research and development allowing it to participate only in the home market. We assume that two markets are segmented because of trade barriers, such as transport costs. At the start of the game, demand, production cost and transport cost parameters are revealed and become common knowledge. Since the realized parameters may differ from those that were expected when sunk costs were incurred, a firm may regret having incurred its sunk cost to become a potential participant, and indeed, it may elect not to participate. Although the previous literature on predatory dumping frequently assumes forms of imperfect information (see Eaton and Mirman (1991) , and Hartigan (1994)), we show that predation may arise in a perfect-information framework.
After the state of the world is revealed, the government in the home country or more aptly its antidumping administration has the prerogative to set a tariff. For the most part, we assume that the government will choose to levy a tariff if there is a perceived threat of predation on the one hand or of dumping on the other hand. It is assumed once a tariff is set, it is not subject to later revision and it remains in place whatever the behavior of the foreign firm.
Consequently the specific tariff, t , becomes the key policy parameter in the model and we focus on comparisons between anti-predation and anti-dumping settings of t . Finally, after any tariff is implemented, a one-shot quantity-leadership game is played in the home-country market where the foreign firm is assumed to be a quantity leader because its product must be shipped first. While such leadership situations may be infrequent in practice, they open the door to predatory behavior and, thus, still warrant careful consideration. As we 2 The model could be expanded to allow for tariffs, which are contingent on either predatory or dumping behavior by the foreign firm and equal to zero in the absence of such behavior. Initial work in this direction suggests that qualitatively similar results would be obtained.
will see, the leader-follower structure implies that, even in the static setting, the foreign firm may engage in predatory behavior that preempts the participation of the home firm purely on the basis of maximizing single-period profits. Thus, higher monopoly returns in the future are neither necessary nor sufficient for predation to occur in the present. 3 Little additional complexity arises when we assume that the two firms produce differentiated products, and this facilitates comparison with the price-leadership variant of the model, which is presented in the appendix. While the main results of the price-setting game are similar to those of the quantity-setting game, the differences between two models will be mentioned in the text.
To simplify comparative statics, we assume linear inverse demands and constant marginal costs. 4 In the region of quantity space where prices are positive, the demand functions in the home market are:
where the subscripts f and h indicate the foreign firm and home firm respectively; the consumers. Given that the home firm does not participate in the foreign market, the inverse demand function for that market is simply:
Production exhibits a simple form of economies of scale. We assume that a minimum startup amount of labor must be in place before any output is produced giving rise to quasi-fixed costs given by h φ and f φ for the home and foreign firm respectively. Since these quasi-fixed costs serve as a potential barrier to participation, we refer to them as participation costs. Once the startup labor is in place, a constant additional amount of labor is needed to produce each unit of output. Consequently, the foreign and home firms incur constant marginal costs, given by h c and f c . Assuming constant marginal cost for the foreign firm simplifies the analysis since its sales in the two markets remain independent and do not affect each other through rising or falling marginal costs. 5 The foreign firm also faces trade barriers on shipments to the home market. In addition to the specific tariff, t , a transport cost parameter, τ , arises because a constant amount of labor is required to ship each unit of the product.
The operating profits (exclusive of sunk costs) of the foreign firm selling in both the home and foreign markets, and the operating profits of the home firm, only serving the home market, are simply revenues minus costs.
Setting the quasi-fixed participation costs aside momentarily, the variable profit of the foreign firm in the home market is
, and the variable profit of the home firm in the home market is
. For reference purposes, we note that the standard Cournot reaction functions based on these variable profits would be written as:
Participation costs introduce the possibility of discontinuities in these reaction functions. For discussion purposes, however, we assume that the foreign firm obtains sufficiently high variable profits on its own market to overcome its participation costs, f φ . Consequently, the foreign firm will always participate in the foreign market, and its participation costs will not prevent it from operating in the home market.
By contrast, the participation costs of the home firm, h φ , do act as a barrier to its participation in the home market, which may be used by the foreign firm to preempt participation of the home firm. Given the presence of participation costs, the home firm's reaction function is discontinuous. In Fig. 2 , which is based on Dixit (1979) , 
as well.
Since we assume that the foreign firm has to ship its goods to the home market before the home firm, there is a quantity-leadership game, rather than a simultaneous quantity game in the home market. Consequently, as shown in Fig 2, the home firm is a Stackelberg follower, which maximizes its profits in accordance with its Cournot reaction function, given the foreign firm's shipments to the home market. The shipment decision of the foreign firm hinges on its own profits. In the home market, the foreign firm can preempt participation by producing slightly more than the limit output 
Predation: If
, then the foreign firm preempts participation and sells just above the limit quantity such that ε In the accommodation scenario, which is different from that shown in Fig. 2 In the predation scenario, which is the one shown in Fig. 2 , the home firm encounters moderate participation costs such that the trigger output is strictly larger than the limit output and the limit output is at least as large as the monopoly output (i.e.,
). In this case, the profit that the foreign firm earns when shipping slightly more than Nevertheless, the decision to participate by the foreign firm will significantly lower the foreign firm's profit. The expected profit for the foreign firm with a positive probability of participation is smaller than the profit of preempting participation with an output marginally higher than h f B . Consequently, it is reasonable that the foreign firm sells the quantity marginally greater than
when the foreign firm chooses to sell at its monopoly point, then the home firm is simply not sustainable.
Although the price-leadership game discussed in the appendix has different, somewhat more complex reaction functions, the reaction function for the home firm is still discontinuous due to its participation costs. Accordingly, predation can occur in the price-leadership game as well, and we obtain results similar to Prop. 1.
The Impact of Tariffs
Although Dixit (1979) shows that Prop. 1 generally holds regardless of functional forms, we can solve the model mathematically based on linear demands and constant marginal costs for any particular level of tariffs. In a subsequent step, we can then analyze the effects associated with tariff changes. Regardless of the situation in the home market, the foreign firm always sells at its monopoly quantity on the foreign
We can also solve for the foreign firm's monopoly output in the home market using its own reaction function given by Eq. (6):
represents the monopoly output of the foreign firm when tariffs are absent. For tariffs less than βμ 2 , there is a negative linear relationship between the tariff and the monopoly output of the foreign firm, which is shown by the AGHF line in Fig. 3 .
Using the home firm's standard Cournot reaction function given by Eq. (7), we can also obtain the monopoly output of the home firm:
which we assume is always positive. Next, we solve for the foreign firm's maximum limit output using the home firm's reaction function given by Eq. (7). 
If participation costs are absent, the limit output is at the maximum level such that
Of course, both the maximum limit output, For an internal Stackelberg equilibrium, the leadership output of the foreign firm and the follower output of the home firm are as follows:
7 These Stackelberg outputs are obtained by maximizing foreign firm's profits given by Eq. (4) subject to the home firm's Cournot reaction function given by Eq. (7). (14), we obtain
We can also solve for the foreign firm's Stackelberg trigger output, which is given by intersection between the Stackelberg iso-profit contour and the horizontal axis. moves toward the origin to 1 Z . Consequently, the line segment EF in Fig. 3 shows the trigger output in boundary situations where . This implies that if the home government imposes an anti-predation tariff, there are situations where the foreign firm will immediately accommodate the participation of the home firm by leading with an output that is equal to zero, rather than positive. In other words, an anti-predation tariff may not be prohibitive in some circumstances, but it will be in other circumstances.
Since a tariff raises the effective marginal cost of the foreign firm in the home market, Prop. 2 reveals that the home government can levy a tariff high enough to preclude predation.
Moreover, in the price-leadership game, the similar proposition applies, because this result relies primarily on Prop. 1.
While the analysis has been primarily concerned about tariffs and quantities, which the foreign firm ships, it is important to also consider the implications for pricing by the foreign firm. . For a small tariff less than * t , the foreign firm monopolizes the home market, and the price is less than 1 p . As the tariff rises, the monopoly output falls, the price rises, and the foreign firm's profits fall. When t reaches * t , the home firm would be able to enter the home market with a positive output if the foreign firm continues with its monopoly output and price. Consequently, the foreign firm produces slightly more than the limit output and charges a price equal to 1 p to preempt participation by the home firm. Further increases in the tariff leaves the foreign firm's output unchanged and its price constant at 1 p , but its profitability continues to decline. When the tariff reaches * * t , it becomes more profitable for the foreign firm to accommodate participation by the home firm. Thus, there is a discrete decline in the foreign firm's output. In the case shown in Fig 5, output is equal to zero, which implies that the prices are greater than or equal to 3 p . The appendix shows that broadly similar results can be obtained for the price-leadership model.
Proposition 3 Changes in the tariff affect the price of the foreign product as follows:

Dumping versus Predation
As we have seen, dumping is defined to exist when a firm in one country exports its product to another country at a price below that which it normally charges in its own country (pricebased dumping) or below its average costs of production (cost-based dumping). For the most part, we will focus on price-based dumping. Price-based dumping is said to occur whenever the dumping margin,
is positive. In other words, dumping exists if the foreign firm charges lower price on the home market than the price on its own market adjusted for transport costs. If dumping is detected, the home country is usually able to impose an antidumping duty.
11
We consider two types of antidumping duties. First, we define a standard or partial
, which is equal to the dumping margin when the tariff is equal to zero. Second, we define a sophisticated or full antidumping duty, fadd t , to be the minimum tariff that would generate a dumping margin that is less than or equal to zero.
12
While full antidumping duties are attractive from a theoretical standpoint, almost all antidumping duties that are implemented in practice are, at least initially, partial antidumping duties.
13
11 In addition to a positive dumping margin, authorities must also show that there is material injury or a threat of material injury to the home industry. In practice, a `But-For' approach is generally used to define material injury.
In this approach, the authority conducts a counter-factual analysis to compare conditions of the targeted industry in the presence of dumped goods with an estimate of conditions of the industry without such goods. Material injury is said to exist when the targeted home industry would have been better off `but for' the sales of dumped commodities. In our model, material injury always occurs because the home firm would have enjoyed monopoly profit if the foreign firm did not participate. Hence, we assume that antidumping duties are always allowable if the dumping margin is positive. 12 In the model, there are some situations where there will be a single tariff, or a range of tariffs, that result in a dumping margin exactly equal to zero, but in other situations, the smallest tariff that stops dumping leads to a negative dumping margin. 13 The antidumping authority may periodically review the situation and increase the duty if it finds that dumping persists in spite of the initial duty. Such an iterative reviewing and resetting procedure may, in some situations, approximate a full antidumping duty.
Dumping and predation depend on different criteria. Predation hinges on the relationship between the limit output, Consequently, the predation criterion depends on the cost parameters of both firms and demand parameters of the home market. While the demand parameters of the foreign market are irrelevant to predation, they have a role in the price comparison that comprises the dumping criterion. This observation leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Dumping and predation are separate and distinct matters:
1. Dumping and predation may coexist.
2. Predation may occur when dumping does not.
3. Dumping may occur when predation does not.
Neither dumping nor predation may occur.
Proof: The proof is straightforward. In Prop. 4, if
, then predation occurs.
Since the dumping margin includes the foreign price, ) (
, which could be greater or less than zero. Thus, when predation occurs, dumping may or may not occur, establishing in the situations 1 and 2.
Similarly, if
h f h f B Z ≤ , then predation does not occur. The dumping margin,
, once again, could be greater or less than zero, which establishes situation 3 and 4. Δ Tab. 1 summarizes situations in Prop. 4, and also invites further consideration of the situation where the dumping and predation coexist. 
A standard or partial antidumping duty will lead to accommodation if and only if it
happens to exceed the anti-predation tariff, * * t .
A sophisticated or full antidumping duty always leads to accommodation.
Proof: The first part of proposition follows immediately from Prop. 
t . Δ
Overall, these results suggest that antidumping policies cannot be justified on the basis of preventing predatory behavior by foreign firms. In accordance with Prop. 4, antidumping duties are permissible in some situations where there is no predation, and predation may exist in other situations where antidumping duties are not permissible. Even when dumping and predation coexist, Prop. 5 implies that a partial antidumping duty may either be too small to prevent predation or unnecessarily large. Finally, if predation and dumping coexist in the initial zero-tariff equilibrium, a full antidumping duty will prevent predation, but it may be unnecessarily large in the sense of being greater than * * t . Further, full antidumping duties appear to be of limited practical importance in this context because of calculation difficulties.
14 Similar results apply in the case of cost-based dumping. Suppose that the foreign firm has no sales in its own country so that the price-based dumping criterion cannot be used. Rather than being based on the price of the foreign firm on its own market, the dumping margin given by Eq. (17) is now based on the average cost of exporting to be
, where h f ψ represents the sunk costs of the foreign firm. Since the foreign firm's average cost of exporting depends on its participation and sunk costs, the cost-based dumping criterion differs qualitatively from the predation criterion. Consequently, Prop. 4 and Prop. 5 go through for cost-based dumping as well as price-based dumping. Appendix II indicates that there is a similar non-equivalence between anti-predation tariffs and antidumping duties in a priceleadership game.
Welfare Analysis
It is important to consider whether predatory behavior by the foreign firm necessarily reduces welfare in the home country. The home country's quasi-linear utility function, which generates the simple linear demand system given by Eqs.
(1) and (2), can be written as:
14 It is apparent from Eq. (17) 
Under predation where W , is obtained from tariff revenue, the profits of the home firm, and consumer surplus from both products.
To assist with welfare comparisons, we define a benchmark situation where: (a) the high boundary tariff for an internal Stackelberg equilibrium exceeds the anti-predation tariff such We begin with a comparative welfare result that is similar to Brander and Spencer (1981, p. 380 In Appendix I, we extend these results by showing that the home country may be better off assessing its best tariff consistent with predation rather than its best tariff consistent with accommodation. While countries may wish to prevent predation on producer-fairness grounds, Prop. 7 implies that preventing predation is not necessarily in the national interest.
Conclusion
This paper investigates the relation between antidumping duties and predatory behavior by foreign firms in a context that is new to the literature. The prior literature on predatory dumping emphasizes multi-period models where future monopolization, or at least increased market share is the motivation for predation in the present period. For example, in Eaton and Mirman (1991) the foreign firm is able to exploit asymmetric information concerning its own market, while in Hartigan (1996) the home firm is vulnerable to predation due to the financial market imperfections. By contrast, we show that predation can arise in a simple one-shot game with perfect information that adapts the Stackelberg entry deterrence framework developed by Dixit (1979) and Brander and Spencer (1981) . In this setting, the foreign firm is a first mover and, under some conditions, may use its leadership position to force the home firm out of the market.
Antidumping duties, however, turn out to be a dubious weapon for combating such predation.
We show that under some circumstances, an antidumping duty is implemented in the absence of predation, and under other circumstances, no dumping duty will be imposed in the presence of predation. Even when the underlying conditions favor predation by foreign firms and governments do impose antidumping duties on foreign goods, simple duties, which are typically used in practice, may not be sufficient to preclude predation. Further, while sophisticated duties, which are designed to eliminate dumping, are sufficient to prevent dumping, such duties are generally larger than necessary. Although there is no substantial evidence that predation by foreign firms is widespread in reality, the results of our modeling, thus, suggest that antidumping duties cannot be justified as a policy mechanism to prevent predation. While antidumping duties are supposed to offset unfair pricing practices by foreign firms, they generally punish foreign firms for activities such as price discrimination and selling below costs, which are generally both acceptable and legal for home firms.
We also extend welfare analysis in Brander and Spencer (1981) to address two new issues.
First, we find that home-country welfare may be higher if the foreign firm were to choose predation rather than accommodation. Second, we show that, even when the foreign firm would choose predation, the home country does not inevitably gain by imposing an antipredation tariff, which induces accommodating behavior by the foreign firm. Consequently, while preventing predation always serves the interest of the home firms, it does not always necessarily serve the national interest.
The model could be adapted to incorporate tariffs that are contingent on the presence of either predation or dumping. This would allow somewhat richer profit-maximizing behavior on the part of the foreign firm since it could exempt itself from tariffs by choosing not to predate on the one hand or dump on the other hand. 17 Nevertheless, it appears that our key qualitative results will continue to hold because the differences between the predation versus dumping criteria will continue to lead to separate and distinct anti-predation versus anti-dumping tariffs.
The model could also be extended to allow a repeated-game structure. Suppose that the home firm's participant-status lapses if it remains out of the market for a sufficient duration. On the one hand, depending on its expectations of future market and cost parameters, there may be an added incentive for the home firm to participate in the present period so as to maintain its status. On the other hand, the prospect of future monopolization is likely to provide additional incentive for present predation by the foreign firm. Further, the possibility of future 17 Indeed, with appropriate contingent tariffs set by the government, the foreign firm would choose not to predate or dump and, thus, would be exempt from tariff charges. monopolization complicates the national welfare picture for the home country and it appears to make it more likely that preventing predation would be in the national interest.
While current antidumping policies are poorly designed for handling predation by foreign firms, the prognosis for policy reform remains problematic. Detecting truly predatory behavior by any firms, whether home or foreign, is typically very difficult in practice. In the international arena, it may be hard to differentiate between situations of foreign monopoly and foreign predation. For example, it may be politically and economically difficult to establish whether a home firm is no longer viable given the current market and cost conditions. Once predation has been detected, there is not a straightforward formula for the anti-predation tariff even in the simple world of linear demands and constant costs, which we model. This suggests that to the extent that trade policy has a role in fighting predation by foreign firms, import quotas may be more appropriate instruments than tariffs. 18 More broadly, the regular instruments of competition policy seem likely to be a better first-line of defense against foreign as well as home predation. Trade policy measures could simply be held in reserve in the case of non-compliance by the foreign firms.
18 For example, suppose With other aspects of the model remaining the same, suppose there is now a price-leadership game where the foreign firm is still the leader and the home firm is still the follower. Fig. 6 illustrates simple geometric solutions for the home market. We focus on the area OFGK, where both firms sell positive quantities in the home market. The home firm, once again, has a discontinuous reaction function due to participation costs. In Fig. 6 , FB and EWXY including the end points of both segments indicate the home firm's reaction function. Note that there is a kink at point W on the home firm reaction function, where the foreign firm ceases to produce, because the home firm's iso-profit curve is vertical at this point. This contour intersects the 0 = h f q line again above the right of the home firm's pure monopoly point X as shown in Fig. 6 .
